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ABSTRACT 
Data encryption is one of the key information security technologies used for safeguarding 
multimedia content from unauthorised access and manipulation in end-to-end delivery and 
access chains. This technology, combined with the appropriate cryptographic methods, 
effectively prevents the content against malicious attacks, so as to protect its authenticity as 
well as integrity. While encryption based security is ensuring the authorised consumption of 
the multimedia content, content adaptation technologies have the primary goal of providing 
means for wider dissemination of the content across diverse networks, devices and users, and 
thus enriching user satisfaction and experience of the delivered content within a given set of 
usage environment constraints. Traditionally, protected contents can only be adapted at 
trusted adaptation engines residing between the source and end-users since they have to be 
fully decrypted before performing the necessary adaptation operations. The drawback of such 
a process is that it significantly limits the availability and flexibility of adaptation engines 
applicable for adapting protected contents on the fly. Thus, this paper proposes a novel 
scalable H.264/Advance Video Coding (AVC)-compatible video encryption technique, which 
is also transparent to adaptation engines in an end-to-end video delivery scenario. The 
proposed technology relies on keeping syntax elements required for performing the adaptation 
operations clear (i.e., not encrypted). The effectiveness of the proposed technique has been 
successfully verified in scenarios, where both conventional Joint Scalable Video Model 
(JSVM) bit stream extracting and random packet dropping mechanisms are used. 
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1. Introduction 
Today’s multimedia communication landscape has been greatly shaped by the coexistence of 
a number of complementary as well as competing codec, access, delivery and consumption 
technologies. With this heterogeneity of the underlying technologies in mind, guaranteeing 
the Quality of Experience (QoE) [1][2] expected by users is a nontrivial exercise. In addition 
to the technological factors, the diversity of user preferences, as well as when and where the 
content is consumed add additional dimensions to the already complex dilemma. As a result, 
under the umbrella of the Universal Multimedia Access (UMA) concept, the notion of 
transparent access to rich multimedia content is widely discussed in the research community 
[3]. The MPEG-21 standard, one of the most recognised efforts to pave the way to the success 
of UMA, has promoted the content adaptation to achieve the goals of the UMA [4].  
 
While UMA is laying out the foundation for seamless access to multimedia resources, there is 
also an undeniable demand for certain restrictions to accessing protected multimedia contents. 
In the wake of a technological challenge to prevent sheer levels of piracy, the entertainment 
industry well understood the importance of such restrictions and used Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) technologies to protect their invaluable contents. These techniques 
effectively limit the use of copyrighted contents. It is not only the consumer multimedia 
industry that takes measures to prevent the unauthorised access of the content, but also those 
who have a pressing need for protecting sensitive contents delivered over hard-to-trust 
communication infrastructures such as users of Virtual Collaboration Systems (VCS) also 
benefit from these technologies. However, these content security technologies also limit the 
content adaptation possibilities. 
 
This paper focuses on protecting visual media content through encryption, in order to prevent 
unauthorised access. Traditionally, protected content can only be adapted at trusted adaptation 
engines residing between the source and end-users since such content has to be fully 
decrypted before performing the necessary adaptation operations. Therefore, only a trusted set 
of Adaptation Engines (AEs) can be used for adapting protected contents. However, this 
restriction effectively limits the choice of AEs. To the best of our knowledge, any attempt to 
eliminate the need of a trusted AE for adapting encrypted scalable video has not been reported 
in the literature to date. Video adaptation and encryption has been discussed together for 
encrypting adapted video contents only. The techniques proposed in [5],[6],[7] and [8] 
assume that either the content is received unencrypted or they are decrypted prior to 
performing the adaptation operation. Consequently, none of these techniques are fit for end-
to-end adaptation architectures. Thus, this paper proposes a novel adaptation-aware 
encryption concept for securing scalable video. The paper also proposes enabling 
technologies for Scalable Video Coding (SVC) extension of H.264/AVC-compatible 
(H.264/SVC) [9][10] video to achieve transparency to AEs in an end-to-end delivery scenario. 
The high level view of such a scenario, in which the proposed adaptation-aware encryption 
architecture is employed, is illustrated in Figure 1.The proposed encryption mechanism offers 
full protection to scalable content while still providing necessary transparency for AEs to 
perform adaptation operations. The transparency is achieved by encrypting only a part of the 
bit stream so that necessary syntax elements needed for performing intended adaptation 
operations are available without decrypting the content. One of the advantages of the 
proposed algorithm is that a compatible decryptor is capable of identifying the encrypted 
segments even without any assistance from the encryptor through signalling. Another 
advantage of the proposed technique is that it can identically be used in both the packet 
oriented and byte stream [10] oriented transmission scenarios. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the background on 
the encryption and scalable video adaptation concepts. Section 3 presents the security 
architectures for content adaptation followed by the description of the proposed adaptation-
aware encryption technique in Section 4. Section 5 discusses experimental results, and finally 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
Figure 1. High level view of a typical end-to-end secure content delivery scenario 
2. Background 
2.1. Introduction to basic cryptographic algorithms 
This subsection introduces basic concepts related to symmetric cryptographic algorithms, i.e., 
those in which the same key is used for encryption and decryption. Further details on these 
concepts can be found in various references, such as [11], [12] and [13]. 
 
Two basic types of symmetric encryption algorithms exist: stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
Stream cipher combines the plaintext with a pseudo-random bit sequence, known as 
keystream, generated from the encryption key. In contrast, the block cipher encryption 
algorithm works on separate input blocks of fixed length, typically 64 or 128 bits, to produce 
output blocks of the same length. Encryption with a block cipher may require padding of the 
input plaintext in order to process an integral number of blocks. 
 
Stream ciphers have the property that repetitions in the plaintext are not detectable in the 
ciphertext. If two or more fragments of the input are identical, when they are combined with 
corresponding fragments of the pseudo-random keystreams, they yield different output 
fragments. This also means that an attacker cannot insert duplicate fragments of ciphertext 
with the hope that they are interpreted, when decrypted, as repetitions of the original content. 
If there is some integrity check in the contents, such repetitions would be detected as 
corrupted data. This property is of particular interest in audiovisual applications such as video 
surveillance. 
 
Block encryption, if used in a straightforward manner, does not show this behaviour. Equal 
input blocks, when encrypted with the same key, produce equal output blocks. In order to 
conceal possible repetitions in the output bit stream, the so-called modes of operation of block 
ciphers are defined. The same technology is also capable of detecting forged repetitions in the 
encrypted bit stream when Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are used. Examples of such 
modes are those known as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output 
Feedback (OFB). In these modes, each block of ciphertext Ci is not obtained from the 
corresponding block of plaintext Pi alone, but from some combination of Pi and the previous 
encrypted block Ci-1. In this way, there is an additional input to each instance of the 
encryption algorithm, which is variable and propagates through the data to be encrypted, and 
therefore masks any possible repetition in the input blocks. 
 
Moreover, in some modes like CFB or OFB the encryption algorithm is applied to some 
values computed from Ci-1, and the result is then combined with the plaintext block Pi. Thus, 
CFB and OFB effectively transform the block cipher into a stream cipher, where the block 
encryption algorithm is used as the pseudo-random generator. This means that in these modes 
the length of the input does not need to be multiple of the block length, and padding is 
therefore unnecessary. 
 
If each block Pi is encrypted in combination with Ci-1, for encrypting the first block of 
plaintext P1 it is necessary to use some C0 block. This is called the Initialisation Vector (IV) 
and is simply a sequence of n bits, where n is the block length of the algorithm, which are 
generated randomly and used for encrypting the first block as though they were the result of a 
previous encryption. 
 
A side effect of this is that using a different IV every time a new block cipher encryption is 
started, the output always is different even for identical inputs. In other words, duplicates are 
masked in the output not only within a run of the encryption system, but also from one run to 
another. However, this is not true in pure stream ciphers. Encrypting some input and then 
restarting the system and encrypting the same input again with the same key necessarily 
produces the same output. For this reason some stream cipher algorithms have been adapted 
to accept an IV thus making them parametrisable. The IV in this case determines the initial 
state of the keystream generator. 
 
In either cipher type, stream or block, the IV is generally prepended or otherwise attached to 
the encrypted data because it is needed for correct decryption, and it is not necessary to keep 
it secret since an attacker does not gain any useful information by analysing the value of the 
IV nor comparing it with the ciphertext. 
2.2. Adaptation of H.264/SVC video  
H.264/AVC has a two-layered architecture [14]. The top layer, the video coding layer, derives 
a set of compact code sequence representing the input video sequence. The bottom layer of 
H.264/AVC, which is known as the Network Abstraction Layer (NAL), organises these 
codewords into a set of logical units called Network Abstraction Layer Units (NALUs) for 
optimal delivery over a given communication network. These NALUs can be parsed 
independently and if the reference frames are available, they can subsequently be decoded. 
 
Evolving H.264/SVC standard [10] inherits all the features of the H.264/AVC standard. The 
objective of this extension is to address the increasing demand for context-aware content 
adaptation through simple, low complexity operations and also to improve the error resilience 
[9]. The standard supports a number of scalability options including spatial, temporal and 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) scalabilities. The basis of the scalability in H.264/SVC is the 
NALU. It encodes the picture data in such a way that the adaptation can be performed by 
simply dropping a set of NALUs from the bit stream. Temporal scalability is achieved 
through developing a hierarchical prediction structure in which the pictures belong to higher 
temporal resolution layers are predicted from pictures belong to the same temporal resolution 
layers or lower. In contrast, the spatial resolution layers are predicted from lower spatial 
layers and temporally neighbouring pictures. Similarly, SNR enhancement layers are 
predicted from the corresponding base layer and temporally neighbouring pictures. Due to the 
above discussed hierarchy, adaptation can be achieved through discarding NALUs defining 
unwanted scalability layers. The importance of these NALUs in content adaptation and 
specific adaptation scenarios are briefly discussed in the following subsections.  
2.2.1. Types of NALUs and their importance in adaptation 
Basically, there are two classes of NALUs. The first class is called the Video Coding Layer 
(VCL) NALUs and they carry coded representation of the base layer or an enhancement layer 
of a picture. Generally, an AE discards a selected set of VCL NALUs to perform the 
adaptation operation. However, the content of these NALUs are not altered during the 
adaptation operation. The second class of NALUs is known as non-VCL NALUs. These 
NALUs deliver supporting information, which may be required for decoding the encoded 
picture data or presenting them. Parameter sets (i.e., Sequence Parameter Sets (SPS), SPS 
extension, sub-SPS and Picture Parameter Sets (PPS)), Supplemental Enhancement 
Information (SEI) and Video Usability Information (VUI) are some examples of NALUs 
belong to this category. Amongst these NALU types, those carrying parameter sets have 
direct impact on the decoding process. This is because syntax elements defined in these 
parameter sets are needed for decoding VCL NALUs. Therefore, VCL NALUs have direct or 
indirect references to parameter sets. As a result these NALUs can only be discarded if none 
of the remaining NALUs in the bit stream refers to them. More importantly, these NALUs 
cannot afford to be lost because they are needed for decoding many VCL NALUs. However, 
SEI and VUI NALUs have no direct impact on decodability of VCL NALUs. They carry 
extra information to help displaying the decoded pictures. Therefore, depending on the 
context, this information can be dropped or altered. 
2.2.2. Random packet dropping and prioritised packet dropping 
Random packet dropping can be considered as adaptation to ease bottleneck situations over 
communication networks when routers cannot cope with high volumes of traffic that pass 
through them. Since each NALU can be decoded independently, the H.264/SVC bit streams 
offer some resilience to random packet droppings during the transmission over a lossy 
channel. More accurately, the loss of a VCL NALU makes only one scalability layer or a part 
of the layer unavailable. When the lost information is recovered with an appropriate error 
concealment technique, the rest of the bit stream can be decoded. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the loss of one or more parameter sets may prevent decoding of a large number of 
frames if not the entire sequence. Hence, it is necessary to make sure that these NALUs reach 
the destination. Various techniques such as repeated transmission of those NALUs at regular 
intervals, use of out-of-band secure channel, and hard coding parameters sets at the decoder 
have been proposed to mitigate this problem [14]. 
 
In contrast, the prioritised packet dropping makes use of the priority indices to select the 
packets to drop for traffic shaping. The advantage of this technique over random packet 
dropping is that the decoded picture quality can be improved by carefully assigning the 
priority indices for each NALU before transmission. H.264/SVC supports such exercise by 
offering a dedicated syntax element in the NALU header. Nevertheless, there is a high chance 
that the priority index stored in the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) packet header [15] is 
used for this purpose since it provides more generic solution. In any case, the encoder (or any 
third-party entity before transmission) should assign the priority indices. 
2.2.3. Systematic adaptations 
Systematic adaptations are performed by specialised AEs. Even though, there is no standard 
to define a systematic AE, MPEG-21 Digital Item Adaptation (DIA) [16] outlines a generic 
architecture. This architecture, however, depends on the availability of an associated Bit-
stream Syntax Description (BSD) [17] for each encoded bit stream. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of a systematic AE can follow any liberal architecture. An example of such a 
systematic AE is the JSVM bit stream extractor. 
 
Similar to any adaptation of scalable contents, these AEs eliminate a selected set of NALUs. 
However, the NALU selection algorithm considers more factors than just the priority of the 
NALU. For example, the JSVM Bit Stream Extractor (BSE) considers the spatial, temporal 
and quality layer IDs available in NALU headers, and also the frame size (width and height in 
pixels). Since it considers the frame size, which is defined in the scalability information SEI 
message, the AE should be able to decode the SEI messages. A possible adaptation operation, 
which can be performed using the information available in NALU headers and scalability 
information SEI messages, is the extraction of a scalability layer with an expected spatial 
resolution or smaller. Moreover, these AEs can drop not only unnecessary VCL NALUs, but 
also the subset SPSs and PPSs which are not useful to decode remaining VCL NALUs and 
modify SEI messages such as scalability information and sub-sequence information. Table 1 
shows the non-VCL NALUs present at the beginning of the bit stream before and after 
adaptation. Here, the adaptation of the Foreman test sequence (CIF, i.e., 352x288 at 30 frames 
per second, fps resolution) encoded with two spatial and four temporal scalability layers to 
extract the lowest spatial resolution (QCIF, 176x144) at highest temporal resolution (30 fps) 
is considered. 
Table 1. Non-VCL NALUs present in the original and adapted bit streams 
Original bit stream Adapted bit stream 
NALU 
number NALU type 
NALU 
length 
NALU 
number NALU type 
NALU 
length 
0† SEI 250 0‡ SEI 147 
1 SPS 9 1 SPS 9 
2 Subset SPS 12 2 PPS 4 
3 PPS 4    
4 PPS 5    
5 PPS 5    
 
Since systematic adaptation techniques require some specific information from the bit stream, 
AEs that perform such adaptations need access to the relevant information. This information 
includes scalability layer IDs specified in VCL NALU headers, PPS IDs specified in the slice 
headers of VCL NALUs and some SEI messages. 
3. Security architectures for content adaptation 
None of the traditional encryption approaches consider the adaptability of scalable video. 
Consequently, adaptation of video encrypted with these techniques relies on trusted AEs, 
                                                 
†
 Scalability information SEI message 
‡
 Scalability information SEI message 
which decrypt the content before performing the adaptation. Novel to the technique proposed 
in this paper is that the encryption is transparent to scalable video adaptations. Therefore, with 
the introduction of the new encryption technique, there are two basic security architectures 
that can be considered for content adaptation: security based on trusted AEs and end-to-end 
security. 
3.1. Trusted AE based architecture 
In this architecture, the AE must perform a decryption, adaptation and re-encryption cycle in 
order to adapt the secured contents as illustrated in Figure 2. The cryptographic keys, which 
are known to the source and the legitimate end-user, must also be shared with the AE. In a 
possible variant scheme, the original contents can be encrypted with one key known to the 
source and the AE, and the adapted contents can be encrypted with another key known to the 
AE and the end-user. 
 
The fact that the AE decrypts the input content prior to adaptation has the following security 
implications: 
 
 Trust must be placed on the AE, because the content in unencrypted form will be 
available to it after decryption. Therefore, the use of the trusted AE is based on the 
confidence that it is not under the control of an opponent that could make illegitimate 
use of the adapted content. 
 
 The trusted AE must also be robust so that the unencrypted content will never be 
revealed to unauthorised third parties accidentally. This robustness implies that an 
attacker cannot gain profit from the AE's reaction to unusual or unexpected conditions. 
For example, if restrictions apply to some certain content, the AE must guarantee that, 
if they are applicable to any form of the content, they cannot be bypassed through an 
adapted version, e.g. by requesting an unusual resolution. 
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Figure 2. A trusted AE for encrypted content adaptation  
When sharing the encryption keys with the AE, special care must be taken in order to prevent 
capture of these keys by the third parties, and to ensure that they are being sent to the 
authentic AE and not to a fraudulent entity impersonating it. If the keys are sent over the 
network, an appropriate secure key exchange protocol should be used. 
3.2. End-to-end security adaptation architecture 
In order to overcome the issues that may arise with trusted AEs, an alternative solution is to 
use adaptation techniques that do not require the AE to decrypt the input content as illustrated 
in Figure 3. In this way, end-to-end security is attained since no attacks to the AE will impair 
the protection of the content. 
  
Figure 3. An AE for an end-to-end security adaptation architecture  
This scenario is more secure but also more complex on the encoder side, and not as generic as 
the trusted AE case because not all types of adaptations can be applied “blindly” to contents, 
i.e., without knowing the actual value of the contents. Only those adaptations which consist of 
dropping parts of the content, such as spatial cropping, Region Of Interest (ROI) selection, 
lowering temporal resolution or discarding higher quality layers, are candidate techniques to 
end-to-end adaptation. The actual feasibility of these transformations depends on the encoding 
method used for conveying the audiovisual contents. 
 
With regards to security, the advantages of the end-to-end architecture can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
• The bit stream is not available in an unencrypted form at any moment during the 
adaptation, thus there is no risk that the protected content is leaked, intentionally or 
accidentally, out of the AE. 
• Since the AE does not need to decrypt the bit stream, no cryptographic keys have to 
be shared or exchanged with the AE. Thus, this architecture removes the need for 
implementing key management protocols in the AE. 
• The fact that the AE does not have access to the unencrypted content or to the 
encryption keys implies that no special security measures have to be applied to it. 
Then, there is no need to deposit trust on the AE, which in turn means that 
identification and authentication protocols for the AE are not necessary either. 
 
From the performance point of view, on one hand the end-to-end architecture may require 
specific additional computations in order to guarantee content protection in this blind 
adaptation scenario (e.g., for obtaining appropriate initialisation vectors as in the technique 
described in Section 4 below). But on the other hand, the use of a non-trusted AE relieves this 
architecture of authentication and key exchange procedures with the AE, which reduces the 
complexity of the implementation. 
4. Proposed adaptation-aware encryption method 
The objective of the proposed adaptation-aware encryption algorithm is to keep the bit stream 
as transparent as possible for an AE in order to achieve the end-to-end protection discussed in 
Subsection 3.2. Therefore, the proposed technique encrypts only the carefully selected parts 
of the bit stream so that the syntax elements potentially carrying useful information to 
facilitate the adaptation operation are available unencrypted. As a result, the secured bit 
stream contains encrypted portions as well as unencrypted (clear) portions. Since necessary 
syntax elements are available clear in the bit stream, a compatible decryptor is capable of 
locally deriving information needed for decrypting the encrypted bit stream. In order to 
encrypt the selected encryptable portions of the bit stream, any standard encryption algorithm 
can be used. This section elaborates on the proposed method. 
4.1. Security requirements for end-to-end adaptation 
The proposed adaptation method is designed to meet the following security functional 
requirements: 
• Data confidentiality: During the adaptation process, the audiovisual contents must be 
protected from disclosure to any entity, including the AE itself. 
• Concealment of data patterns: The internal relationships between parts of the protected 
contents must not be observable or deducible, in particular any repetition of previously 
transmitted contents must not be detectable. 
• Cryptographic support: The system must use cryptographic algorithms, which are 
standardised or approved by reliable organisations, with the recommended modes of 
operation and minimum key lengths. 
This adaptation scheme does not address any key management requirements other than those 
applicable to the encryption of content in general. Since the AE is completely unaware of the 
keys used for end-to-end security, any existing key management technique can be used 
alongside this algorithm. 
4.2. Selection of data for encrypted 
In general, there are three approaches to select the portions needed for encryption. The first 
approach is to encrypt only a few bytes from the beginning of each NALU. Since the rest of 
the NALU cannot be parsed without correctly parsing the first part due to the use of variable 
length coding, it can be assumed that the information in the unencrypted part of the NALU is 
safe. Since the NALU header is not entropy coded, encrypted part should be extended at least 
few bytes into the rest of the NALU. However, this technique does not offer the full 
protection to the content since a deterministic hacker may still be able to decode the clear 
content using the properties of entropy coding technologies that were used to encode the data 
stream. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that in this case the encrypted part should be at 
least as long as the encryption key. Otherwise a brute-force search on the encrypted parts of 
the bit stream would be more effective than a brute-force search on the key. The second 
approach is to encrypt the entire NALU irrespective of whether the information is significant 
or not providing the strongest protection to the video stream.  
 
The last approach is to encrypt a selected set of syntax elements. The encryption technique 
described in this paper is based on this approach. The technique should be operated carefully 
while selecting which syntax elements to be encrypted since the unencrypted elements may 
reveal enough information for an unauthorised user to guess the content of the entire video. 
For example, one can consider encrypting the motion vectors. However, motion compensated 
residual signal may carry some visual information. Therefore, such an approach may not be 
ideal for an application that needs absolute protection.  
 
The proposed algorithm leaves the first part of each NALU, which spans over the NALU 
header and a part of the slice header, clear. The significant advantages of this approach are: 
• The simplicity since complicated content analysis techniques are not necessary to 
select important syntax elements to be encrypted  
• The greater protection against unauthorised access since all the visual information 
resides in the encrypted portion.  
 
The selection of clear syntax elements is performed by considering whether any of those 
elements are useful for performing the adaptation operation. Adaptation scenarios discussed 
in Subsection 2.2 are critically evaluated to identify the required syntax elements for 
performing adaptation operations 
 For most of the adaptation operations, information in the VCL NALU headers such as the 
scalability layer identifications is required. Therefore, the VCL NALU headers are not 
encrypted. Some adaptation decisions may also benefit from certain information available 
from parameter sets, such as the frame size. Therefore, the parameter set identification syntax 
element, which can be found in the slice header of VCL NALUs, is also left clear. Need for a 
unique Initialisation Vector (IV) for encrypting each VCL NALU, as discussed in Subsection 
4.2 below, is another reason for not encrypting some of the specific syntax elements. 
Furthermore, all of the syntax elements, which are available in the bit stream before the last 
useful syntax element, are also left clear even if they are not useful for any adaptation 
operation (e.g., reserved bits) in order to simplify the encryption process. Considering these 
factors, the syntax elements in a VCL NALU illustrated in Table 2 are identified for not 
encrypting. These syntax elements are available in the first part of the NALU and therefore, 
the rest of the NALU can simply be encrypted. Since the syntax elements shown in the table 
do not carry any encoded picture samples, there is no risk of exposing visual information to 
unauthorised users. It should be noted that some of the optional syntax elements have not 
been shown in this table for simplicity. 
 
Furthermore, all of the non-VCL NALUs are also made available unencrypted in the bit 
stream. These NALUs are also free from encoded picture samples and therefore there is no 
threat of visual information leaking through these NALUs. Nevertheless, syntax elements in 
parameter sets are needed for parsing some of the syntax elements, such as frame_num, in the 
slice header which are useful for encryption. 
4.3. Initialisation Vector (IV) 
Audiovisual contents, considered as static data, can be encrypted with any type of encryption 
algorithm. But if these contents are to be transmitted in real time, as in a live streaming 
session, some algorithms are more appropriate than the others. 
 
If a stream cipher is to be used, some synchronisation information such as a packet number 
needs to be sent in the clear portion of the video stream, in order to detect loss, repetition or 
re-ordering of packets. With this information, the receiver can detect packet loss and skip over 
the fragment of keystream matching the lost packets, so that decryption may continue at the 
right point with the next received packet. The skipped keystream may have to be generated 
nevertheless if a feedback generator is used in which each bit of the keystream depends on the 
value of the previous ones as it is common in stream ciphers. 
 
With a block cipher, or with a stream cipher that accepts an IV, there are two main 
approaches: to use one single IV for the whole session, or one IV for each individual packet. 
Possible intermediate solutions would be based on groupings of packets and using an IV for 
each group. If a single IV is used, the same considerations apply as for pure stream ciphers 
mentioned above. Furthermore, in some modes of operation, e.g. CBC and CFB, loss of one 
block prevents decryption of that block and the next one encrypted with the same IV. 
 
Table 2. Syntax elements which are made available unencrypted 
 
Name of the syntax element as defined 
in the H.264/SVC specifications Description 
Used 
for IV 
forbidden_zero_bit   
nal_ref_idc   
nal_unit_type Identifies the NALU type  
reserved_one_bit   
idr_flag   
priority_id Indicates the priority of the NALU  
no_inter_layer_pred_flag   
dependency_id Spatial layer identification  
quality_id Quality layer identification  
temporal_id Temporal layer identification  
use_ref_base_pic_flag 
If set, the quality layers are predicted from the base 
quality layer of the reference frame and otherwise 
higher quality layers have been used  
 
discardable_flag If set, the NALU can be discarded  
output_flag   
N
A
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reserved_three_2bits   
first_mb_in_slice Identifies the first macroblock of the picture the slice 
starts from  
slice_type Slice coding type (intra, inter, bidirectional)  
pic_parameter_set_id Identifies the PPS corresponding to the slice  
frame_num An identifier for pictures§  
field_pic_flag If set, the slice is a slice of a coded field  
bottom_field_flag If set, the slice is part of a coded bottom field  
idr_pic_id 
When two consecutive pictures in decoding order are 
both Instantaneous Decoding Refresh (IDR) pictures, 
a different value is assigned to the latter 
 
pic_order_cnt_lsb An identification for the picture**  
delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom   
Sl
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redundant_pic_cnt 
If the slice is a redundant representation for a coded 
picture is a non-zero value is assigned to this syntax 
element. 
 
 
A possible additional requirement for live streaming transmissions is that participants may be 
able to join the session at any moment. If a block cipher with one single IV or a stream cipher 
is used, a new participant will need information on the updated encryption vector or the 
current state of the keystream generator, respectively. The latter must not be revealed to third 
parties or else an attacker could easily compute the rest of the keystream. 
 
For these reasons, and because of some issues related to the use of an IV in stream ciphers 
[18], it is typical for encrypted streaming protocols to use block ciphers with an independent 
IV for each packet. This is the case in e.g. the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) 
[19], the secure version of the RTP streaming protocol (RFC 3550). In RTP, packets consist 
of two parts: header and payload. In SRTP a compatible header format is used, and the 
payload, i.e. the audiovisual content, is encrypted with a block cipher algorithm, Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) [20], using an IV constructed from certain fields of the header, 
one of which is a packet sequence number, thereby guaranteeing the uniqueness of the IV. 
 
                                                 
§
 This syntax element does not uniquely identify a picture in the encoded bit stream. More than one consecutive 
picture may share the same value for frame_num. 
**
 This syntax element does not uniquely identify a picture in the encoded bit stream. Values may be reused at a 
later stage in the bit stream. 
In our system, in addition to all of the previously mentioned requirements, we need to cope 
with content adaptation. When adaptation is performed in an end-to-end fashion, it consists 
basically of dropping parts of the content and perhaps duplicating certain parts (for enhanced 
error resilience). Therefore, we need an encryption scheme that allows decrypting the bit 
stream successfully even when some fragments of the encrypted content are missing, in a 
situation similar to that of packet losses in an unreliable network. For the same reasons 
explained above, we are using a block cipher algorithm with an IV derived from selected 
fields in the NALU header combined with a global IV, whose value is common for all of the 
NALUs in the same stream. This global IV is generated randomly every time a stream is to be 
encrypted, so that encrypting the same stream twice produces different results. 
 
In our tests, we have used the AES algorithm, against which no realistically effective attacks 
are known today [21], with 128-bit keys and both in the CBC and CFB modes. In order to 
make sure the IV is unique for each NALU, it is constructed using a number of syntax 
elements from the NALU header and the slice header as shown in Table 2. In the picture 
level, the value of the frame_num syntax element may be shared among a number of 
consecutive pictures. When combined with the pic_order_cnt_lsb syntax element, which has 
different values for consecutive pictures, it is possible to make an identity for each picture. 
However, if redundant representations for a given picture are also available in the bit stream, 
the redundant_pic_cnt syntax element is used to identify each redundant NALU uniquely 
since the frame_num and pic_order_cnt_lsb combination remains the same for all the 
redundant representations. Similarly, delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom is necessary for identifying 
the top and bottom fields of an interlaced picture. In a rare case, the encoder may decide to 
encode a number of consecutive pictures as Instantaneous Decoding Refresh (IDR) pictures 
[10]. In this case, idr_pic_id can uniquely identify each IDR picture even if the frame_num 
and pic_order_cnt_lsb combination resets to zero after encoding each IDR picture.  
 
Even if the above discussed combination of syntax elements uniquely identifies a picture in an 
H.264/SVC bit stream, the issue of multiple NALUs generated by encoding a picture should 
also be addressed in order to generate a unique IV for each NALU. It is obvious that NALUs 
representing different scalability layers of a given picture bear the same picture identification 
code generated combining the syntax elements described in the previous paragraph. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the dependency_id and quality_id syntax elements are also 
incorporated. In case of an AVC compatible base layer case, those syntax elements are both 
assumed to be equal to zero. Still, there is an issue: the total number of macroblocks of a 
given scalability layer of a picture may be distributed into more than one NALU since the 
length of a NALU can be in the range of just one macroblock to all of the macroblocks in the 
scalability layer. In this case, consecutive NALUs may have to share the same IV. Therefore, 
the first_mb_in_slice syntax element is also used to distinguish each NALU. 
4.4. Encryption 
Two distinctive architectures are proposed to encrypt H.264/SVC compatible bit streams. The 
first architecture, which is called the encoder-assisted encryption, relies on the encoder to 
obtain the necessary information for generating the IV and identifying the portions of the bit 
stream to be encrypted. Therefore, in this architecture the encryptor is tightly coupled with the 
encoder. The proposed architecture is shown in Figure 4. The IV generator obtains the values 
of syntax elements required for generating the IV for each NALU from the encoder. The 
encyptor passes input bits to the output clear (i.e., unencrypted) until it receives the signal 
from the encoder to start encrypting them. With this signalling, all of the NALU types, except 
for the VCL NALUs, are passed through to the output unencrypted. In case of a VCL NALU, 
the first part of the NALU is passed to the output unencrypted since it carries the information 
needed for performing the adaptation operations and those needed for generating the IV. The 
rest of the NALU is encrypted. The algorithm to identify the encryptable portions of a bit 
stream is depicted in Figure A1 in Appendix A. 
 
In contrast, the second architecture, which is known as the standalone encryption, is proposed 
for encrypting pre-encoded contents. This architecture is illustrated in Figure 5. The bit 
stream parser parses the first few bytes of the bit stream to extract the syntax elements to 
compose the IV. At the same time, it also determines the start byte of each NALU to be 
encrypted. Once the start location is determined, the parser signals the encryptor to encrypt 
the input. The same algorithm proposed for encoder-assisted encryption scenario is used for 
determining the encryption boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 4. Encoder-assisted encryption 
4.5. Decryption 
Similar to encryption architectures presented in the previous subsection, two decrypting 
architectures are proposed. The first architecture, which is known as the decoder-assisted 
decrypting, depends on a H.264/SVC decoder for obtaining the required parameters for 
decrypting the content. Therefore, the decoder must have the understanding of which syntax 
elements have been left clear by the encryption technique. The proposed architecture is 
illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
The decoder can parse (and decode) the NALUs, which do not carry any encoded picture 
data, without any extra processing since they are not encrypted. However, when a given 
NALU carries encoded picture data, the decoder can parse only the unencrypted syntax 
elements. The latter part of the NALU must be decrypted before decoding the NALU. Now 
the problem is how to determine the encryption boundary. Fortunately, this information can 
easily be obtained by parsing syntax elements known to have been unencrypted. Therefore, 
the decoder parses the first part of the NALU to extract unencrypted syntax elements, which 
are also required for generating the IV. At the same time, the decoder determines the 
encryption boundaries for the NALU. When the last unencrypted byte is parsed, it signals the 
decryptor to start decrypting the rest of the NALU. This algorithm is depicted in Figure A2 in 
Appendix A. 
 
 Figure 5. Standalone encryption 
The drawback of the decoder-assisted decryption architecture discussed above is the need of a 
fully customised decoder, which is fully aware of the encrypting mechanism. This closely 
coupled architecture may not be practical especially when a third party decoder is used for 
decoding purposes. Considering this difficulty, the second decryption architecture, which is 
identified as the standalone decryption architecture, is proposed. This architecture is 
illustrated in Figure 7. In this architecture, a bit stream parser is used for extracting syntax 
elements for generating the IV and deriving the encryption boundary of a given NALU. 
Furthermore, it also identifies the clear and encrypted parts of the NALU by invoking an 
algorithm similar to the one proposed for the same purpose for the decoder-assisted 
decryption architecture. This information is passed to the decryptor through the decryptor 
control signal. 
IV
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Decoded 
video
Encrypted 
bit stream
Decryptor
IV Generator
Decryptor 
control
 
Figure 6. Decoder-assisted decryption 
4.6. Security evaluation 
The following properties of the proposed adaptation scheme can be considered in order to 
assess the fulfilment of the security requirements specified in Subsection 4.1: 
• Data confidentiality: The AE does not need to look at the protected parts of each 
NALU to perform its function. Therefore if the input bit stream is encrypted the 
output remains encrypted, and the actual contents are never disclosed during the 
adaptation process. 
• Concealment of data patterns: The use of a different encryption IV for each NALU, 
derived from carefully selected elements in the non-encrypted part to guarantee 
their uniqueness as detailed in Subsection 4.3, and the use of a random global IV 
for each bit stream, assure that all of the encrypted data will be uncorrelated even if 
the same input sequence is repeated multiple times. 
• Cryptographic support: The proposed method makes use of symmetric block 
ciphers, in one of the chaining modes of operation (e.g., CBC or CFB), but does not 
impose any restrictions on the actual cryptographic algorithm used or on the key 
length. Specific applications may choose the cryptographic engines which are best 
suited to their security needs. 
4.7. Start code emulation prevention 
The encryptor shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 implements a standard encryption algorithm. 
However, this encryption process may produce specific three-byte sequences that shall not 
occur at any byte-aligned position in the H.264/SVC bit stream [10]. The H.264/SVC 
standard specifies four such codes and replacement codes for each of these codes as shown in 
Table 3. An AE may react to these sequences, if they are available in the encrypted bit stream, 
as specified by the standard resulting in undesirable behaviours. Especially, three-byte 
sequences 0x000000 and 0x000001 should not occur in the encrypted bit stream, since they 
are parts of NALU start code prefixes for applications that deliver NALU stream as an 
ordered stream of bytes such as MPEG-2 Systems [22]. Therefore, if any of these sequences 
is detected in the encrypted bit stream, the encryptor inserts an emulation prevention byte 
(i.e., 0x03) as shown in Table 3 to ensure that none of these forbidden three-byte sequences 
occurs in any NALU. This process is known as start code emulation prevention and it makes 
sure the encrypted bit stream is compatible for both packet oriented and byte stream oriented 
delivery scenarios. Analogously, the decryptor shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 maps any 
occurrence of the replacement sequences into the original three-byte sequences prior to 
applying the decryption algorithm 
 
Table 3. Three-byte sequences that shall not occur at any byte-aligned position in the 
H.264/SVC bit stream and replacement when present  
Forbidden three-byte sequences Replacement sequences when 
present in the bit stream 
0x000000 0x00000300 
0x000001 0x00000301 
0x000002 0x00000302 
0x000003 0x00000303 
 
 
Figure 7. Standalone decryption 
4.8. Signalling 
The bit stream corresponding to the encrypted contents, before and after adaptation, must 
provide enough information for the decoder to be able to decrypt the contents. With the 
proposed technique for encrypting the streams, the minimum information required is the 
encryption algorithm and the global per-stream IV. In some cases, certain algorithm-
dependent parameters may also be necessary, such as the variable key length or number of 
iterations. A simple data structure, which can be delivered using any existing signalling 
technique used in secured content delivery, is used for including this information. Apart from 
these, no further parameters are required since the local IV for each NALU is algorithmically 
determined from its header fields. 
4.9. Implications on the error resilience 
One of the major advantages of H.264 standard is that it incorporates a number of error 
resilience features by design [23][24]. The proposed encryption technique treats individual 
NALUs independently that makes it possible to decrypt any NALU regardless of whether 
previous NALUs are available at the decryptor. Therefore, there is no known implication on 
any of the error resilience features available in the H.264 standard in random packet drop 
situations. Besides the random packet dropping, a sophisticated decoder may also be able to 
cope with random bit errors up to a certain extent [25]. With a stream cipher, flipping one bit 
in the encrypted input stream simply causes the corresponding bit in the decrypted output 
stream to be flipped. Therefore, these sophisticated decoding techniques can easily be used 
with decrypted contents. 
 
With a block cipher in general, however, changing one bit of a block affects the whole block, 
so that every bit in this block will be changed with 50% probability. Therefore, error detection 
and correction algorithms such as [25] become increasingly ineffective. However, the use of 
different modes of operation can expand or reduce the error propagation. In the CBC and CFB 
modes, errors within a block (of length n) will produce changes in bits that can be up to 2n 
positions apart. However, the OFB mode behaves in this respect like a stream cipher, so that 
each single bit error produces exactly one bit change in the output. 
5. Results  
The first set of experiments was carried out aiming to investigate the transparency of 
encryption for AEs. Three publicly available test video sequences were encoded with the 
configurations depicted in Table 4. These test sequences were encoded using the H.264/SVC 
reference encoder (JSVM encoder). The NALU length was limited to 1000 bytes, and 
therefore each scalability layer produced one or more NALUs. The base layer is H.264/AVC 
compatible and the scalability information related to each base layer NALU was coded into a 
prefix NALUs [10]. 
 
Table 4. Details of the scalability structure and the length of the test sequences used for 
evaluating the proposed adaptation-aware encryption technique 
Test sequence Number of 
frames 
Spatial 
scalability layers 
(width x height 
in pixels) 
Temporal 
scalability layers 
(fps) 
Total bit rate 
(kbps) 
Forman 400 352 x 288 
176 x 144 
30, 15, 7.5, 3.75  255.30 
Soccer 400 704 x 576 
352 x 288 
176 x 144 
30, 15, 7.5, 3.75  453.22 
CrowdRun 400 1280 x 704 
640 x 352 
320 x 176 
60, 30, 15, 7.5 28849.14 
Both the CFB and CBC encryption modes were used for encrypting the encoded content and 
the bit streams generated with variety of scalability structures. The JSVM BSE was used as 
the AE. After a number of exhaustive experiments, it was concluded that the proposed 
encryption technique is transparent for H.264/SVC compatible video adaptation. This can be 
asserted by comparing the outcome of the whole encryption-adaptation-decryption cycle with 
the result of conventional adaptation, i.e., without encryption. Since both results are the same, 
it can be concluded that the goal of transparency has been satisfactorily achieved. 
 
Subsequently, a similar set of experiments were carried out for validating the algorithm for 
random and prioritised packet dropping scenarios. The criteria for validation were, as in the 
case of transparency, comparison of results between the setup with encryption and that 
without encryption. In order to demonstrate the effect of random packet losses to encrypted 
bit streams, a simulation study was carried out using an IP channel model. The IP channel 
model was implemented using the AVC/SVC loss simulator described in [26] and ITU-VCEG 
loss patterns [27].The test conditions specified in [28] are observed during the simulation 
study. Moreover, the error concealment algorithm used in this experiment considers all the 
lost macroblocks coded with the BLSkip mode [14]. The decoded quality of the encrypted 
and non-encrypted bit streams, which are received over the lossy channel, is compared in 
Figure 8. These bit streams are encoded with IPPP temporal prediction structure and have 
four temporal scalability levels. Experimental results clearly verify that random losses have 
little or no impact on the decryptability of the received bit streams. 
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 (a) (b) 
Figure 8. Effect of transmitting the encrypted bit stream over a lossy IP channel for (a) 
Foreman and (b) Crowdrun test sequences 
 
Theoretically, the proposed encryption technology must also be resilient to any prioritised 
packet dropping scenario. To test this condition, an experiment was carried out in this kind of 
a scenario, in which the Foreman test sequence was encoded with two levels of temporal and 
four levels of quality scalability. Each scalability layer is assigned the priority according to 
the importance so that dropping packets from the lower priority levels minimally affects the 
quality of the decoded video. Hence, the base layer of the bit stream is assigned the highest 
priority (i.e., priority = 7). The quality enhancement layers of the lower temporal scalability 
layer (i.e., 12.5 frames per second, fps) are assigned with the next three priority levels. 
Moreover, the base layer of the highest temporal layer is assigned priority = 3 and the quality 
enhancement layers are assigned the next three priority levels. In our test, it is assumed that 
the router drops the lower priority packets to recover from congestion. If the congestion is 
light, only the lowest priority level is dropped. Table 5 compares the resulting bit rates and 
objective qualities when each quality layer is dropped from the non-encrypted and encrypted 
bit streams. These results show that the encryption algorithm performs well under the 
prioritised packet dropping scenario. 
Table 5. Evaluation of the effect of encryption on the prioritised packed dropping scenario 
Non-encrypted Encrypted Dropped 
priority level 
frame rate 
(fps) Bit rate 
(kbps) 
PSNR (dB) Bit rate 
(kbps) 
PSNR (dB) 
none 25 1,842 37.14 1,842 37.14 
7 25 1,554 36.20 1,554 36.20 
6 25 1,250 35.34 1,250 35.34 
5 25 741 33.92 741 33.92 
4 12.5 723 37.69 723 37.69 
3 12.5 602 36.63 602 36.63 
2 12.5 480 35.72 480 35.72 
1 12.5 298 34.44 298 34.44 
 
The objective of the next set of experiments is to assess the processing and bit rate overheads 
due to the proposed encryption technology. Same test setup used for assessing the 
transparency for AEs was also used for these experiments. Table 6 shows the CFB encryption 
performance for the selected bit streams. Here, AES-128 algorithm is used for encrypting the 
data streams. This experiment was carried out on a 3 GHz Pentium 4 dual-core machine 
running a Linux operating system. It shows that over 95% of the total data bytes have been 
encrypted. It also shows that when the bit rate is smaller, the percentage of encrypted bytes 
reduces. This is because the length of NALU header and the slice header become increasingly 
dominant at lower bit rates. Moreover, encryption time shown in Table 6 indicates that the 
processing overhead per frame is negligible. 
 
Table 6. Encryption performance 
  Foreman Soccer CrowdRun 
Total bytes  425500 755367 24040953 
Number 411493 738601 23686537 Bytes 
encrypted  Percentage  96.70% 97.80% 98.50% 
Number 14007 16766 354416 Bytes not 
encrypted  Percentage 3.30% 2.20% 1.50% 
Total time (ms)  17 26 665 
Bytes/s  24.2 x 106 28.4 x 106 35.6 x 106 
Encryption 
overhead 
Per frame processing time (µs) 77.5 117.5 1797.5 
 
Even though the CFB encryption mode does not have a bit rate penalty, the CBC encryption 
has a bit rate overhead as shown in Table 7, which is a direct consequence of the padding 
algorithm that is applied in CBC for making the input data length a multiple of the cipher 
block length. It should be noted that expected theoretical average padding in an algorithm of 
block length N is (N + 1)/2. Since N = 16 bytes in our experiments, the average padding 
length should be 8.5 bytes. The results shown in Table 7 clearly agree with this theoretical 
average. Furthermore, the Rate-Distortion (RD) due to each encryption mode is illustrated in 
Figure 9. According to Figure 9 (a), the CFB mode does not have any RD penalty. In contrast, 
when the CBC mode encryption is used, there is an RD penalty as shown in Figure 9 (b). 
Again, this is caused by the padding inserted in CBC mode. However, this RD penalty is 
negligible. 
 
Table 7. CBC encryption overheads introduced to the bit stream  
  Foreman Soccer CrowdRun 
Input length  425500 755367 24040953 
Encrypted length  433992 765470 24261093 
Total extra bytes  8492 10103 220140 
Encrypted NALUs  984 1186 25419 
Avg. extra bytes / NALU  8.63 8.52 8.66 
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Figure 9. RD performance of the Foreman test sequence before and after (a) CFB mode and 
(b) CBC mode encryption 
6. Conclusions  
This paper has presented a proposed adaptation-aware encryption concept and discussed the 
enabling technologies for encrypting H.264/SVC compatible video. The proposed technique 
enables end-to-end transparency for scalable video adaptation. Therefore, it is possible to reap 
the advantages of scalability in video coding without compromising the content security since 
the AE does not need to decrypt the content. This objective was achieved by leaving syntax 
elements required for performing the adaptation operation clear (i.e., unencrypted). Moreover, 
some of the clear syntax elements are also used for generating the IV for the encryption 
process. The transparency of the encrypted bit streams was successfully validated for 
systematic scalable video adaptations as well as random and prioritised packet dropping 
scenarios through a comprehensive set of experiments. Experimental results have shown that 
the proposed technique incurs negligible processing overhead. 
 
A disadvantage of the proposed encryption techniques is its strong dependency on the 
H.264/SVC standard. Further experiments are being carried out to exploit MPEG-21 Bit-
stream BSD to develop video-coding-agnostic encryption technologies. 
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Figure A1. The algorithm to determine the encryption boundaries 
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Figure A2. The decryption algorithm for decoder-assisted decrypting a bit stream 
 
